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Abstract: Coase shows how costly resources are (re)allocated via costly institutions, and that 
transaction costs must therefore be positive. However, Coase did not elaborate on transitions 
between institutions which incur positive transaction costs that are characterized by numerous 
institutional complementarities; that is, feedback loops that inform the need for, and pathways 
toward, institutional change. Economic investigations of complementary modes of (re)allocation are 
rarely undertaken, let alone studies of transitions between modes. However, modes of (re)allocation 
that achieve similar results at less cost are generally viewed as having production-raising value. 
This paper measures the costs of transitioning drought management institutions in Italy toward 
informal, participatory, and consensus-based approaches during several recent drought events. The 
chosen model is Drought Steering Committees, which offer a substitute for current formal (less 
flexible) planning approaches, and where lower transaction costs that are associated with the 
transition are inferred. Our results highlight the relevance of empirical assessments of ‘costly’ 
transitions based on a historical study of transaction costs, as well as supporting previous works 
that highlight the value of contextual analysis in economic studies, in order to identify the benefits 
of institutional investment. 
Keywords: Po River Basin; institutional economics; climate change adaptation; cost of adaptation 
 
1. Introduction 
Water, an essential resource, is becoming increasingly scarce and costly worldwide [1]. As water 
scarcity increases, existing institutions that are reliant on inflexible water governance arrangements 
will constrain corrective action leading to a crisis of governance [2,3]. Identifying or transitioning 
toward good governance practices and institutions delivering effective, fair and sustainable 
management of water resources is thus increasingly urgent especially in institutions capable of 
(re)allocating costly water resources during extreme scarcity events, such as drought. 
Generally, institutions can be defined as ‘the rules of the game’ within which political, social and 
economic realities operate [4]. Two overarching institutional categories coexist in water resources 
management: (1) formal institutions, which are established and communicated through channels that 
are widely accepted as official, such as laws and regulations enforced by authorities and (2) informal 
institutions, where the social rules, customs, traditions, or codes of conduct are part of the culture 
and ideology [5]. In both cases, these institution types distribute power to differentially constrain and 
enable actors and facilitate or limit the response(s) of individuals and communities to climate 
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hazards, such as drought [6]. Further, these institutional approaches may complement and/or 
substitute for one another depending on governance requirements and choices. 
Coase [7] introduced institutional choice to economic investigation, extending a notion proposed 
by Robbins [8] that transitions between institutions occur within costly frameworks characterized by 
institutional complementarities. However, although Coase explained that costless bargaining (i.e., 
zero transaction cost institutions) were unrealistic, the concept of positive transaction costs with 
respect to institutional substitution was not considered [9]. Ostrom [10], among others, outline ways 
by which institutional change may be analyzed and selected. However, with respect to transaction 
cost specifically, while earlier works [11,12] affirm multiple options for dealing with transactions, 
they do not elaborate upon the role that economic investigation should take in clarifying the function 
of different modes of resource (re)allocation or organisation. Williamson [13] offers useful insights 
into governance modes and their selection with respect to economizing objectives (e.g., first order 
issues to get the institutional environment right, while third order economizing is better aimed at 
adapting to continuous uncertainty, such as drought). However, Coase typically framed an answer 
to the comparative institutional analysis problem as one of identifying alternative modes of 
organisation that achieve similar results at lower costs, which would enable the value of production 
to increase [11]. An appreciation of these issues by Pagano and Vatiero [9] led them to two hypotheses 
that we are keen to explore in this paper. The first is that institutional change (i.e., from formal to 
informal organisation) involves transition and transaction costs, both of which can be empirically 
measured in order to identify improved (i.e., low(er) costly) governance arrangements (H1). The 
second is that costly institutions imply complex complementarities (e.g., feedback loops akin to those 
discussed by Ostrom [10]), which may limit (promote) substitution. Thus, a historical analysis of the 
complementary institutional factors framing governance choices will be needed to understand 
equilibria outcomes (H2). To test these hypotheses using an applied case study we focus deeply on a 
set of historical transaction costs and institutional outcomes, which are a key premise of institutional 
economics. 
1.1. The study of Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are defined as the costs of resources used to define, establish, maintain, 
administer, and change institutions and organizations, as well as those that are needed to define the 
problems that these institutions and organizations are intended to solve [14]. In the larger context of 
institutional evolution, they are all of the costs involved in human interaction over time. The 
arguments for measuring transaction costs represent an increasingly relevant feature in 
investigations of environmental or common property policy design and analysis, along with their 
budgets and benefits [15,16]. 
From an economic perspective, appropriate formal and informal institutional choices include 
options that minimise/lower all transaction and abatement costs [14]. In the context of complex 
multiscale problems, such as water management, the measurement of transaction costs usually 
focuses on markets and other formal institutions [17,18], with little research being conducted on the 
transaction costs of informal institutions [19]. The latter are frequently used for water resource 
management in several areas worldwide, particularly to mitigate the adverse effects of droughts, e.g., 
through informal water markets [20], quota-based water reallocation [21], or risk sharing [22]. 
Reasons for reliance on informal institutions include trust, networking, shared norms, and reciprocal 
arrangements, which may help to lower total transaction costs [23]. 
Measuring transaction costs is challenging, leading Quiggin [24] to describe them as generally 
being treated by economists as “something of a black box, the contents of which are inaccessible”. 
Most water management institutions do not empirically quantify institutional transaction costs such 
that they can be easily distinguished from other cost categories. Researchers also report a number of 
difficulties that are related to the measurement of transaction costs, often suggesting that data are 
partial and indirect and/or derived from limited cost typologies or proxies to represent transaction 
costs [25]. Further, there is no broad agreement on a standard terminology about the definition of 
transaction costs [26]. For this reason, it seems unclear how to identify the peculiarities of a 
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transaction, and which expenses/investment should be regarded as transaction costs. All of the above 
is even more challenging where informal institutions may amplify accounting data gaps. 
Consequently, economic investigations of complementary institutional modes of (re)allocation are 
rarely undertaken while using empirical transaction cost measures, let alone historical studies of 
transitions between modes. 
However, a relatively common feature of transaction cost measurement is the distinction 
between ex-ante and ex-post costs; that is, those occurring before and after the transaction. The sum 
of ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs yields total transaction costs. Total transaction costs can be 
further divided into: (1) administering, monitoring, contracting, and enforcing current policy 
arrangements (termed static transaction costs) and (2) periodically designing, enabling, implementing 
new, and/or transitioning existing management arrangements to new systems (termed institutional 
transition costs). In addition to these costs, the total transaction costs may be increased when 
subsequent adaptation requirements are triggered by policy shocks or surprises (termed institutional 
lock-in costs) [14]. Table 1 references the typical transaction costs categories and examples, sub-
divided between ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, which we will focus on later in the analysis 
section. 










River Basin development planning and closure  
(cap on water diversion) 
Hydrologic and socio-economic studies 
Enactment or litigation 




Modification to storage and distribution, licensing 
systems and trading rules  






Transaction planning, identification of buyers and 
sellers, administrative reviews 
Contracting Water rights due diligence 
Monitoring and 
detection 
Water use accounting 
Prosecution and 
enforcement  







Revised caps on water diversion 
Adapted water rights and water user association rules 
Acquiring water rights for the environment if cap on 
water diversion is revised downward 
Source: 
[28] 
Source: [29] Sources: [14,18,30] Source: [17,18] 
1.2. The Contribution of this Study 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether, via a case study of informal drought management 
arrangements in northern Italy, less costly—and ideally improved—governance arrangements have 
been achieved (H1). This evaluation will entail a historical examination of the evolution of water 
governance institutions for Italy, in general, and Po River Basin (PRB) drought management systems 
in particular (H2). We will then measure and track transaction costs with respect to transitioning 
drought management institutions toward informal, participatory, and consensus-based approaches 
during several recent drought events, with a view to identifying any evidence of low(er) transaction 
costs coupled to similar—or improved—drought management outcomes. Ultimately, this approach 
will enable an assessment of the hypothetical propositions and their value for further study to 
develop the assessment process. The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we assess the 
historical context of the case study area, the PRB in northern Italy; in Section 3, we present methods 
and data; in Section 4, we conduct an empirical transaction cost analysis of the institutional transition 
in the PRB; Section 5 discusses the results; and, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Historical Institutional Analysis 
The PRB is located in northern Italy and extends, with five per cent of its total area (~74,000 km2), 
to portions of French and Swiss territory (Figure 1b). In terms of average annual water discharge, the 
PRB is one of the largest in Europe with an outflow at the mouth of the Po River in Pontelagoscuro 
of 1470 m3/s. Po River flow rates depend on the water captured and stored in artificial reservoirs in 
the mountains, principally in five lakes (Maggiore, Como, Iseo, Idro, and Garda) located at the foot 
of the Alps. Demand for water is high: the PRB supplies water for hydropower generation in 
upstream lakes and reservoirs, and potable water to some 3700 municipalities within seven 





Figure 1. (a) the seven river basin districts in Italy; (b) the area of the PRB; and, (c) the boundaries of 
the territory managed by the Po River Basin Authority(red outline). 
The system also supplies irrigation water to Italy’s largest contiguous agricultural region, which 
comprises 21.5% of total Italian agricultural land, contributes 30% of national agricultural value-
added production [31], and represents around 80% of total water extractions [32]. Water is also 
needed in the lower reaches of the river to mitigate salinity intrusion during low flow or drought 
periods—as the area is located below sea-level—and to support fisheries and aquaculture demand. 
Average precipitation ranges from a maximum of 2000 mm in the Alpine regions of the PRB to 
less than 700 mm on the eastern plains, with an annual average of 1100 mm. Under future climate 
change temperatures will increase, while summer precipitation will likely decrease [33]. Po River 
discharge is expected to decline during the summer months—when the demand is typically at its 
peak—and shift to higher levels of discharge in the winter (Figures 2 and 3). 
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Figure 2. Anomalies in (a,b) seasonal precipitation in % and (c,d) two meter mean temperature in °C 
for the PRB, 2041–2070, versus a 1981–2010 benchmark period. Left side (a,c) refers to raw CMCC-
CM/COSMO-CLM outputs, while the right side (b,d) indicates the bias-corrected climate projections 
[33]. 
 
Figure 3. Climate change signal for the period 2071–2100 versus 1981–2010 for mean precipitation, 
maximum, and minimum temperature [34]. 
Thus, the frequency and intensity of extreme events, such as droughts, are expected to increase 
making current levels of water extraction in the basin unsustainable [35]. Evidence of these changes 
is already noticeable at the regional and local levels, with recorded rainfall reductions and increased 
temperature variations of around one degree centigrade [36,37]. Droughts also appear to be affecting 
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the region more frequently, with a State of Emergency (SoE) being declared in 2003, 2006, 2007, and 
2017. Since 2000, these SoE events have lasted 25 months in total, with an average duration of 6.25 
months per declaration. A coordinated climate change adaptation strategy that identifies the main 
impacts of climate change for a number of socio-economic sectors in Italy was adopted in 2015, 
followed by a National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change (PNACC) [38]. The PNACC encourages 
institutions to identify effective ways to mainstream adaptation into existing plans and regulations 
at different levels of territorial government [21,39]. River Basin Authorities are responsible for 
identifying and coordinating drought adaptation actions and measures. 
2.1. Water Abstraction Licenses Regime in Italy: An Obstacle to Climate Change Adaptation 
The current system of creating and managing water abstraction licenses (WAL) in Italy creates 
a significant obstacle to the effective implementation of these two adaptation strategies. Originally, 
Italian legislation viewed water as a plentiful resource, and this attitude has remained essentially 
unchanged since the 1930s. As a result, the volume of authorised WAL in the PRB now exceeds 
average water availability; for example, current hydroelectric and agricultural licenses amount to 
1840 m3/s, against an average river flow of 1470 m3/s [21]. 
Although many licenses are dormant, over-allocation complicates the management of water 
deficits during drought periods. WAL quotas are also difficult to implement in Italy [40,41] due to 
the fragmented nature of WAL, and the challenging interplay of Italian water institutions [42] where 
regional governments have been granted the power to regulate WAL matters. For these reasons, the 
PNACC proposed a revision of the WAL regime system [38,39]. Recent legal definitions and laws 
now recognise the limits to national water use, and articulate collective uses of water resources in 
Italy with respect to protection of environmental water resource uses (Law 183/1989), integrated 
water resource management (Law 36/1994), and the protection of water quality (Environmental Code 
152/2000). The government sought to reorganise water services in the early 2000s, in what was then 
regarded as a first step towards the introduction of market and pricing reallocation mechanisms. In 
June 2011, a law favouring privatisation of water supply and sanitation, largely viewed as opening 
the possibility of water trading, was repealed by referendum. The prevailing view following the 
referendum was that access to water should be treated as a fundamental right, not subject to free 
market reallocation. Thus, the referendum outcome limited the use of formal market instruments 
such as water pricing, trading, or buyback for drought management [43], requiring alternative 
institutional arrangements. Ultimately, the capacity of river basin managers to coordinate parties and 
address climate change impacts and future population and economic growth, and/or to prioritise 
different water uses during drought has been compromised, and regional governments granted the 
power to regulate WAL matters. Governance of water resources in Italy thus remains complex, 
emergency-driven, and focused on short-term problem-solving. This is particularly evident during 
drought events in 2003, 2006, 2007, 2015, 2016, and 2017, where reactive strategies probably increased 
the negative impacts of water scarcity. 
2.2. Formal Drought Management Institutions 
In the absence of market-based reallocation mechanisms drought management in Italy has 
traditionally focused on formal command and control approaches, where the state intervenes in the 
management of basin water resources as a last resort instrument (Law 225/1992) to enact water 
restrictions with sanctions for non-compliance [44]. By contrast, recent evidence of climate change 
and increased drought events from 2003 onwards have served to focus EU Member States’ attention 
on alternative political and technical responses that involve participatory (e.g., informal) approaches 
[45] over prescriptive (e.g., formal) sanctions. A key document was the communication addressing 
the problem of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union [46], which presented an initial 
set of non-mandatory policy options at the European, national, and regional levels to address and 
mitigate the challenge posed by water scarcity and drought. 
During the process of transitioning the European Water Framework Directive (EU-WFD) into 
national legislation, the PRB experienced a severe drought event in 2003 that presented a significant 
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threat to urban, industrial, and agricultural water supplies. The Italian government formally declared 
a SoE, which enabled them to: (i) centrally manage drought emergency interventions in the PRB for 
a period not exceeding 180 days (but which could have been extended by another 180 days by the 
central government); and, (ii) allocate funding for initial drought management interventions, with 
the option for further interventions where recognised as necessary by the delegated commissioners 
in charge of managing the emergency. This formal institutional arrangement was managed by the 
National Civil Protection Department (NCPD), anchored to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
which supervised all activities. 
2.3. Informal Arrangements for Drought Management—The Case Study 
In the 2003 drought event, the NCPD and Po River Basin Authority (PRBA) jointly sought to 
avoid last resort interventions by the central Italian government. Both were concerned about the 
impact of the drought on energy supply, and the need to act more rapidly (and collectively) to address 
issues in line with EU best drought management practices. Consequently, a Drought Steering 
Committee (DSC) was initiated, presided over by the PRBA, with the purpose of coordinating 
communication and voluntary responses to drought across a large number of organisational 
members. The DSC constituted an informal institution, because it was not legally recognised, and 
stakeholders participated on a voluntary basis. Further, there was no capacity for sanctions in the 
case of non-compliance with decisions made at the meetings and, in cases of conflict, the DSC could 
not be sued and/or prosecuted due to its informal status. Therefore, any decisions had to be made via 
agreement or consensus due to a lack of explicit legislative (formal) mandate in support of those 
activities. Ultimately, trust among the membership, networking and shared objectives were expected 
to reduce total institutional transaction costs of drought management, as outlined below. 
The mission of the DSC, sanctioned under a Memorandum of Interest (MoI), was to manage 
severe water deficits in a unified manner and to delay or prevent critical water shortages. Two main 
objectives were included in the MoI: (i) maintenance of minimum water withdrawal opportunities 
for downstream irrigators and Po River Delta water users (e.g., aquaculture); and, (ii) maintenance 
of hydroelectric outflows to guarantee maximum possible electricity production, as requested by the 
national transmission grid operator. Under these common objectives, the DSC initiated a network of 
information gathering aimed at measuring lake storage data, monitoring of PRB water flows in real 
time, and a summary of WAL water uses. These measures served to better assess and understand the 
negative impacts of the drought, contributed to an overall stabilization of water flows and 
availability, and brought progressive increases in supply to WAL-holders during the drought. This 
initial success meant that, since 2003, the DSC has been convened again when necessary to deal with 
PRB drought events and to limit (potentially costlier) state intervention. Drought management 
planning through the DSC is now enshrined in the Po River Basin Plan [47], along with requirements 
for water-stress mapping, temporary restriction measures for intensive (e.g., back-to-back rotation) 
cropping, and early-warning systems that are based on basin modelling. 
The success of the DSC has also become a reference point for the management of water crises in 
Italy more generally, given its capacity to aggregate and coordinate various stakeholders’ interests 
when considering regional differences. Therefore, the DSC is now recognized by the Italian 
government as an effective instrument for the fair and sustainable management of water 
withdrawals. In 2016, legislation provided for the mandatory activation of a DSC in each of the seven 
Italian basin districts, along with responsibility for coordinating different local water authorities. 
These DSCs are aimed at harmonizing adaptation efforts under the larger Permanent Observatory 
(PO) institutional structure in Italy, which monitors climate dynamics and variability, climate 
hotspots, and natural environmental hazards from extreme weather events. 
The success of the original PRB-DSC suggests that it may provide a useful model for jurisdictions 
beyond Italy, particularly in the EU. Incentives for a jurisdiction to participate in their own version 
of the DSC are two-fold. First, the DSC represents an opportunity to coordinate with other water 
users before any drought declaration is made, after which centralized (distant and/or coercive) 
decision-making arrangements may dominate to reduce negotiation/adaptation opportunities. 
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Second, the DSC is an opportunity to foster greater mutual understanding and trust among relevant 
organisations, increased information exchange, and collaboration between water users that may 
otherwise be hampered by administrative and political fragmentation. The informal nature of the 
DSC may also lead to relatively inexpensive institutional arrangements that are more readily enacted 
(institutional transition costs) and administered (static transaction costs) by other watersheds with 
limited or poor water right structures. 
From this assessment, we conclude that our understanding of the equilibria transition from 
formal to informal drought management institutions in the PRB is enhanced by considering 
complementarities and how they have hindered certain institutional choices, while fostering the 
selection of others. This lends support to H2 and the value to economic investigations from a 
consideration of the historical context. However, whether the transition has broadly resulted in 
low(er) costly modes of organisation (H1)—and therefore productivity increasing outcomes—is the 
subject of our subsequent analysis. 
3. Materials and Methods  
3.1. Stakeholders, Interviews, Document Analyses, and Assessment of Governance Arrangements 
Our measurement of transaction/transition costs was based upon extensive stakeholder 
consultations. The stakeholders are all of the interested parties who affected, were affected by, or 
otherwise influenced drought governance decisions. We defined the domain of stakeholders 
involved in the DSC and different focus levels, which range from identifying relevant institutions 
and key persons to finding the interactions and associated transaction costs. Our methodology 
comprised: (i) analysis of water allocation governance frameworks in place; and, (ii) analysis of 
informal DSC institutions and how these are embedded within the national and regional PRB 
governance. Initial meetings were held with senior members of the DSC to identify whom to 
interview. Face-to-face and telephone interviews were scheduled and conducted involving a total of 
12 experts, with each interview lasting around two hours. The interviews enabled us to explore 
technical and organizational details that are necessary to identify sources of transaction cost data. 
3.2. Transaction Costs Data Collection, Categorisation and Analysis 
McCann et al. [30] established a framework and typology for transaction costs measurement 
based on previous work from Thompson [48], which we follow in this study. The data collection 
approach is similar to that detailed in Loch and Gregg [49]. The main function of the DSC is to 
coordinate stakeholder participation and consensus in the wake of significant drought event periods. 
Routine technical meetings during non-drought periods—which, together with hydrologic basin 
modelling, constitute the bulk relevant transaction costs—are also commonly arranged by regional 
authorities with the support of Environmental Protection Agencies (EPAs). DSC meetings were used 
to track stakeholder involvement, with the salary cost rates (per hour) at each expert-level providing 
a proxy base value for transaction costs estimates. These data were obtained while also considering: 
physical or virtual participation by experts in meetings; estimates of travel distances and/or costs 
from the organization to which they belong to the venue of the meeting; and, the duration of the 
meeting. Information for the study was collected through interviews and meetings minutes. For some 
meetings the minutes were not available, requiring additional interview data collection to fill 
information gaps. Our approach was informed by previous studies that interviewed government 
staff [50] and representatives of stakeholder groups [51] to identify the time spent on various relevant 
activities within the organisations. Further, in 28 out of 235 cases, the mean salary cost values 
(~€70,000 per annum) had to be assigned when information was not publicly available or provided 
in the interviews. DSC meetings and related transaction costs were then classified based on their key 
focus: meetings to agree memoranda of understanding involved ex-ante enactment costs; meetings 
to develop/test new hydrologic models for the basin involved ex-ante design and implementation 
costs; meetings to extend the modelling framework and, thus, enhance institutional capacity to 
monitor water use and compliance and limit illegal abstractions that are involved ex-post monitoring 
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and detection costs; while meetings to incorporate the DSC institution within the PO arrangements 
for Italy as a whole provided some measure of lock-in (i.e., substitution-hindering complementarity) 
transaction costs. 
The DSC was assisted by the PRBA through organisation of meetings, data collection and 
analysis, and technical advice. Initially (2003–2008), this role was accomplished with the support of 
an external service provider that was subsequently transferred to the PRBA (2008–2016). Financial 
data from the PRBA provided transaction costs related to the collection of information in support of 
decision-making by the DSC, including hydrologic modelling and analysis. As an example, two 
external staff from the Regional Environmental Agency of the Emilia-Romagna Region (ARPA-ER) 
worked part-time on the development and maintenance of the hydrological model to support DSC 
activities. It should be noted that the total transaction costs involved in the DSC process were 
absorbed by different organisations at different points of the original program life-cycle (2003–2016). 
Table 2. summarizes for the case of the DSC the classes, sub-classes, typology, and categorisation 
of transaction costs, plus the data sources used for data collection. 
Table 2. Categorisation of transaction costs, adapted from [30], Garrick [27], and [14], including 







Transaction Costs for 









The meetings of the 
DSC (minutes) 
Meeting minutes (stakeholders involved, 
duration of the meeting), personal 
interviews (salary cost rates, physical or 
virtual participation, participation in 
meetings, travel distances, duration of 
meeting) and estimates through sensible 




Enactment: includes all 
the meetings for the 
signing of the 
memorandum of 




Hydrologic studies and 
modelling of allocations 
supporting the decision 
of the DSC 
Financial records and other publicly 







The organisation of the 
meetings (design costs)  
2003-2008: Financial records; 2008-2016: 
Structured interviews with representatives 
of stakeholders to obtain information of the 
personnel involved, plus estimates through 
sensible adjustment of salary costs  
Contracting Not present NA 
Monitoring and 
detection 
The meetings for the 
hydraulic modelling 
As in research and information typology 
Prosecution and 
enforcement  






Meetings to include 
DSC arrangements 
within PO framework 









As an example, in order to calculate the research and information costs corresponding to the 
physical participation of an expert from Torino in a DSC meeting, the travel time between Torino and 
Parma (headquarters of the PRBA) was obtained, and multiplied by a standard cost per km to 
generate the transportation costs by car, or alternatively the cost of the train ticket was used, 
depending on the type of transportation used. This amount was added to the salary cost rate (per 
hour) times the duration of the travel plus the duration of the meeting to obtain the corresponding 
transaction cost(s). Following this travel cost calculation, we could estimate that a representative of 
the Regional Environmental Agency of the Piedmont Region (ARPA-Piedmont), taking part in an in 
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person meeting in 2017, spent EUR 120 in the train trip (economy ticket, high speed train). Next, the 
salary cost was obtained from institutional salary tables (60,000 EUR/year), its’ hourly equivalent 
calculated (assuming a standard 36 h/week working time and 52 weeks per year yields EUR 32.1), 
and multiplied by the duration of the meeting (1.3 h) plus the duration of the round trip (5.2 h), which 
gives as a result EUR 208.3. The total cost for this participant is therefore estimated at EUR 328.36 
(208.3 + 120).  
Another example is provided for hydrological model implementation, the most significant 
transaction cost in the 2006–2011 period. This transaction cost is obtained as the sum of the cost of the 
contract with an external provider during the 2006–2011 period, obtained from accounting records 
(EUR 700,000), plus the cost of the personnel employed by ARPA-ER from 2008 to support the 
consulting firm and maintain and update the model once the consultancy was over, which is obtained 
as in the example above multiplying the hourly cost of the personnel dedicated to model support and 
maintenance times their dedication to the task. 
After data for each cost item were carefully collected and calculated, they were transformed into 
real values using 2017 as the base year (e.g., meeting costs during the 2003 drought were converted 
into euro of 2017 using data from the World Bank [52]).  
All final transaction costs were then categorised into institutional transition (ex-ante) and static 
transaction (ex-post) costs, as per Table 2. Following the method adopted by Loch and Gregg [49], 
analyses were performed to identify: trends in each category over time, summed total transaction 
costs for the DSC, and comparisons between drought and non-drought periods. The following 
sections detail the results of the institutional mapping exercise, which assists in our assessment of 
whether the institutional transition achieved similar/improved outcomes, and subsequent 
transaction cost analysis to measure and assess the costs of that process. 
4. Results 
4.1. Stakeholder Map and Assessment of Drought Governance Arrangements 
Current drought management systems in the seven Italian river basin districts involve three 
main actors with differentiated roles and responsibilities for River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs): 
national government and ministries in coordination role; river-basin district authorities in 
operational role; and, regional governments and administration in both coordination and operational 
roles (Figure 4). They are all part of PO, and they have to implement the RBMP through a Protection 
Plan (PTA) by addressing the qualitative and quantitative water resource management objectives. 
Based on the objectives of the PTA, the Optimal Territorial Areas (ATO, for the domestic use of 
water) and the Land Reclamation Boards (LRB, for the management of irrigation water) are in charge 
of preparing the Area Plan (AP, in Italian: Piani d’Ambito) and Water Conservation Plans (WCP), 
respectively. During this process, drought is monitored through the relevant sub-basin’s Drought 
Management Plan (DMP), a subsidiary instrument to the RBMPs that assesses the basin status on a 
continuous basis using four stages (normal, pre-alert, alert, and emergency), and identifies 
appropriate measures for delaying and/or mitigating drought impacts (e.g., information campaigns) 
[40]. Therefore, a variety of legislative requirements must be adhered to with respect to drought 
events. Critical Italian government institutions (from 2016 onwards) include the NDCP, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, the Ministry of Infrastructure, and the Ministry of Environment; all of which are 
accompanied by the National Association of Land Reclamation Boards (ANBI), the Italian research 
organization dedicated to the agri-food supply chains (CREA), the National Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT), Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA), the Foundation representing 
companies operating in the public services of water, environment and energy (UTILITALIA), the 
Association for the reorganization of the Integrated Water Service (ANEA), and the National 
electricity company association (ASSOLETTRICA). The PO are now operating in each of the seven 
Italian RBDs: Padano (i.e., PRB), Alpi Orientali, Appennino Settentrionale, Appennino Centrale, 
Appennino Meridionale, Sardegna, and Sicilia. The PRB regions are the Autonomous Region of Valle 
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d’Aosta; Piedmont; Liguria; Lombardy; Emilia-Romagna, Veneto; Autonomous Province of Trento; 
and, Toscany. 
 
Figure 4. Framework of drought management planning and arrangements in Italy. 
When a drought emergency is declared in the PRB, the DSC is triggered. Naturally, this process 
requires coordination at a decentralized level. The PRBA is responsible for coordinating all DSC 
stakeholders (local and national), and their responses to the emergency drought status (Figure 5). The 
PRBA collects, updates, and disseminates information on the availability and use of water resources 
across the relevant river basin organisations. These include: the Italian Ministries of Agriculture, 
Environment, Infrastructure, and Productive Activities; representatives from each of the five Lake 
Regulators; the Dam Management Agencies; the operator of the national transmission grid (GRTN); 
the inter-regional agency for the Po river (AIPO); the national Association of Land Reclamation 
Boards (ANBI); the agencies responsible for energy supply (SPE); representatives from regional 
drought committees responsible for managing these emergencies at the local level; and, a 
representative from the autonomous province of Trento. The PRBA is responsible for notifying these 
stakeholders that a DSC has been convened, and inviting them to participate in the process and 
provide the latest technical synthesis reporting to describe current water resources through 
indicators, bulletins, reports, etc. This technical information is supported by hydrologic modelling 
data and technical information provided by ARPA-ER, and used to reach decisions on water 
reallocation via agreement or consensus. 
 
Figure 5. Participatory map of the Permanent Observatory (PO) of the PRB and stakeholders, 2016–
ongoing. 
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From the interview process, it became clear that, when first implemented, the DSC was not 
trusted to deliver interventions on its own and needed the administrative support from one or more 
relevant authorities (i.e., the PRBA and other key institutional stakeholders). However, this is 
changing under new PO regulatory structures aimed at strengthening informal cooperation and 
dialogue between water governance organisations within each district to promote sustainable use of 
water resources in line with the EU-WFD. Nevertheless, these arrangements did not increase formal 
institutions. The PO is a voluntary and subsidiary structure supporting integrated water governance 
to manage the collection, update, and dissemination of data on the availability and use of water 
resources in the districts. Thus, the PO provides guidelines rather than prescriptive arrangements for 
the regulation of withdrawals, resource use, and possible compensation to users. During droughts, 
the PO interacts with the DSC to ensure common objectives that include an adequate flow of 
information that is necessary for the assessment of critical water scarcity levels, the evolution of that 
scarcity and current water withdrawals, and for implementing appropriate emergency actions to 
proactively manage the drought event. Therefore, public and private organizations at all levels of 
water governance can participate in the decision-making to achieve these common strategic 
objectives during a drought. 
Thus, the arrangements identified for the PRB above offer a good example of informal water 
governance institutions for managing drought events, where we recall that: (i) the DSC is not legally 
recognized and stakeholders participate on a voluntary basis; (ii) there is no capacity for sanctions in 
the case of non-compliance with decisions made at the meetings; and, (iii) in cases of conflict, the DSC 
cannot be sued and/or prosecuted because of its informal status. Yet, the arrangements detailed above 
also have an increased potential to meet EU-WFD objectives over existing institutional approaches 
due to their integrated water resource management methods, coupled with processes aimed at 
avoiding political or legal interference (last-resort measures) during drought emergency response 
implementation. The DSC demonstrates capacity for coordinating actions on a voluntary basis and 
encompassing a wide range of stakeholder trust (democratic legitimacy), while achieving robust 
water governance institutions. Thus, the transition to informal institutional arrangements in support 
of successful adaptation to drought events appears to have achieved improved drought management 
outcomes, but at what cost? 
4.2. Transaction Costs Measurement and Analysis 
We must be able to observe some reduction in the average static transaction costs and that any 
periodic institutional transition costs associated with drought events must be short-lived (i.e., 
evidence of improved total outcomes) in order to test whether a transition to informal institutions 
with improved outcomes has been achieved at low(ered) costs over time. Our measurements of total 
DSC transaction costs for establishing, coordinating, and managing the DSC are summarised in 
Figure 6, while the share of ex ante and ex post transaction costs is shown in Figure 7—where a 
change in (ex-post) transaction costs for new institutions cannot take place without (ex-ante) 
transition costs in support of those changes. A more detailed breakdown of the individual ex ante 
and ex post transaction cost categories is available in Appendix A. The base-line for our cost-
reduction analysis is the 2003 drought event, when the DSC officially came into existence. 
The initial transaction costs were relatively significant in that year, consisting mainly of 
enactment and research/information gathering investments. Growth in total transaction costs was 
then experienced in response to three-consecutive drought events (2005–2007). This corresponded to 
investments in further information gathering, administrative costs for the DSC, and hydrological 
modelling to monitor water use across the relevant PRB sub-regions. Interview analysis revealed that 
a significant fraction of these costs that are involved identifying and agreeing upon common 
objectives for the DSC, consistent with informal network requirements and building trust between 
the stakeholders. 
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Figure 6. Total transaction costs for the DSC (years with droughts are in grey). 
 
Figure 7. Ex-ante and Ex-post transaction for the DSC. Droughts in 2003, 2006, 2007, 2015, 2016, 2017. 
Post-2007, no drought emergency events occur in the PRB. Investments in the hydrological 
modelling continued at high levels for a few years (2008–2011) until the contract with the external 
provider that supported the development of the model finished. After 2011, the DSC total transaction 
costs generally fell due to reduced hydrological modelling implementation costs and because 
extraordinary meetings were not needed; thus administration costs for routine management 
comprised the majority of required investment. However, in the period between 2015 to 2017 the PRB 
experienced a series of consecutive drought emergency events. This period also reflected a shift 
toward interaction with the PO arrangements, requiring some increased transaction costs. In 
response, the total transaction costs rose over that period due to increased administration and the 
enforcement of DSC requirements—but critically this increase is approximately one-third of the peak 
transaction costs of previous periods. Some of that lowering of transaction costs was due to an 
increased use of technology to support/conduct DSC meetings, as well as a lower degree of drought 
severity in the later events, relative to the period before 2010. Many of the meetings were now held 
at the PRBA while using media (Skype) lowering the requirement for travel and salary costs to attend 
meetings in person for many of the organisations, as well as the response and coordination times for 
managing drought emergencies. 
With specific regard to individual transaction costs categories (Appendix A, Figure A1), the 
average static transaction costs decreased over the period considered, while short-lived institutional 
transition costs increases were observed during drought events (Figure 6). In total, the trend is 
downward, which suggests a lowering or minimisation of total costs across the life of the informal 
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According to Garrick [27], such trends indicate robust institutional outcomes—i.e., institutions 
that are capable of taking corrective action through “relatively less transaction cost-intensive 
autonomous and planned adaptation”. For our purposes, the measurement of transaction costs 
enables a confirmation of positive transition costs to establish new institutions—as we should expect, 
and in support of H1—but also that this new mode of organisation provides scope for productivity 
and efficiency gains for Italian water users. 
5. Discussion 
The results from our analysis of the collected data offers a novel contribution to the transaction 
cost literature by: (i) applying ex-ante and ex-post transaction cost measurement to informal water 
governance institutions, (ii) providing evidence in support of the usefulness of measuring transaction 
costs for evaluating institutional transition or substitution objectives, (iii) highlighting the relevance 
and value of historical context for economic investigations; and, (iv) showing how informal 
institutions may underpin water governance/management arrangements to lower total transaction 
costs related to drought management in an EU context. Beyond our support for the two main 
hypotheses, the results from the informal management of drought events at river basin scale 
determined the following key points. 
5.1. Drought Management Arrangements 
Drought requires a flexible management approach that is able to monitor the evolution of the 
event, to then respond within and across multiple governance levels (e.g., across multiple 
economizing orders in Williamsons’ framework [13]). In comparison to formal arrangements that are 
available in Italy, the informal DSC approaches outlined above may be more flexible and adaptive 
with respect to drought management and adaptation (third-order economizing), which is also 
consistent with new EU water governance objectives. Shifting the management focus to a local level 
increases the appreciation of drought impacts, and provides for more appropriate responses in 
shorter timeframes than that of monocentric models, although such shifts may also lead to local 
capture of, and rent-seeking in, the policy process. 
Positive effects of the DSC also arise from improved information transmission among 
stakeholders, and a tangible capacity to lower drought impacts and increase adaptive capacity. 
Further, monitoring the availability of water resources (inflows, reservoirs, outflows) and their 
adjustment in real time has allowed for the DSC to more quickly recognise and react to drought 
events via the use of short to medium term forecasting tools, drought indicators, and event evolution 
scenarios. These scenarios have also contributed to the construction of regional technical tools in 
support of managing water balances at the basin scale. Finally, the recent institutionalisation of DSCs 
and relevant stakeholder involvement across all (ordinary) periods of water management through 
the PO, rather than limiting their existence to drought periods, is an improvement upon the typically 
reactive (emergency) commencement of Italian management measures. 
Without a measurement of the marginal centralised transaction costs in contrast to 
counterfactual institutional arrangements, we cannot draw any formal conclusions regarding the 
value for money or total transaction cost differentials. However, the PRB DSC arrangements have 
now been extended across each of the seven River Basin Districts (RBDs) in Italy, formally established 
in May 2017. According to interviewed stakeholders, the DSC arrangements were attractive to the 
Italian government because they did not require any additional funding to implement (i.e., lower 
transition costs), while avoiding some negative impacts of drought events (i.e., improved 
management outcomes). Thus, it seems logical to conclude that the political value of these transaction 
costs and their institutional outcomes has been recognised. By favouring an informal institution, like 
the DSC, the Italian government could potentially observe an increase in the effectiveness of water 
governance arrangements, although it will require further evidence over time to support this 
conclusively. This will be the focus of a future research project involving hydro-economic modelling 
of costs and benefits. 
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5.2. Transaction Costs and Policy Performance Analysis 
Our findings are relevant for policy makers and other stakeholders beyond the PRB. Here, the 
measurement and analysis of transaction costs undertaken paves the way toward performance 
assessment of similar initiatives based on informal voluntary partnerships for water management in 
Italy and Europe. These include incipient river contracts, forums for dialogue and knowledge sharing 
between public/private stakeholders, and local communities in compliance with the EU’s subsidiarity 
principle, which are gaining momentum in Italy and elsewhere in Europe [53]. A constraint to any 
application of the findings reported here may arise from the non-conjunctive catchment 
characteristics of the PRB; that is, they do not share water resources with other basins. This is often 
not the case for the other river basin contexts in Italy or elsewhere in Europe, for whom the issues 
may be more challenging as a consequence, and involve higher transaction costs. 
Moreover, comparisons of the cost-effectiveness of alternative policy options to enhance flow 
rates during droughts must account for the total costs of the options relative to a baseline or status-
quo scenario. These include the transaction costs of the reform measures, along with any abatement 
costs incurred by economic agents during the implementation of local adaptation strategies. Recent 
research focusing on the analysis of abatement costs in the PRB shows that the proportional rule used 
to reallocate water under the DSC approach—which relinquishes a fixed percentage of the initial 
allocation from users, irrespective of the economic losses involved—underperforms other formal 
drought management arrangements, such as water charges [54]. This gap will be further amplified 
via forward and backward linkages among economic sectors within the PRB, and with other Italian 
regions outside the basin. Thus, a complete policy performance assessment calls for empirical 
analyses that combine transaction and abatement costs estimates [55]. This too will be incorporated 
into future research work in the area. 
5.3. Transaction Costs and Uncertainty Analysis 
Finally, water resource management is performed in a context of Knightian or deep uncertainty, 
where it is often not feasible to identify all of the possible outcomes and/or assign a probability to 
each identified possible outcome [56]. Under deep uncertainty, rather than optimal institutional 
settings, we should aim for robustness through the avoidance of path dependent institutional 
trajectories to enable future adaptation in the face of unpredictable future events that are explainable 
only after they happen. This requires adaptive institutional frameworks [27]. 
As indicated above, our transaction cost measurement framework can provide initial 
information on the robustness/adaptive ability of PRB institutional arrangements. However, 
conclusions regarding the robustness of these arrangements in response to future uncertainty would 
need to consider additional measures of adaptive efficiency according to Garrick [27]. For 
completeness, these measures would also have to include the lock-in cost impacts of institutional 
options to allow for a cost-effectiveness evaluation [14]. Similar to the work undertaken by Loch and 
Gregg [49], this would entail identifying and measuring three performance indicators over space and 
time: (1) how well the drought management objective(s) have been met; (2) the average transaction 
costs per unit of those met objective(s); and, (3) total program budgets. For adaptively efficient and 
robust institutions, these three performance indicators should be increasing, decreasing and sufficient 
respectively. Measures of these indicators are beyond the scope of this pilot study, but remain an 
objective for a wider research program focused on identifying instruments best-suited to achieving 
water policy and management targets. The wider research focus of this work will examine maximised 
benefits per unit of transaction cost (alternative measure of cost effectiveness), as well as maximising 
the net public/private gains from transaction cost expenditure (social welfare). This broader 
assessment framework should enable a more comprehensive assessment of total policy or program 
benefit-cost outcomes. 
Finally, future climate change and economic dynamics may change the outcomes that are 
reported in this study. Further research will be necessary to determine under what conditions this 
may happen, and any requirement to adjust or change policy accordingly [57]. 
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6. Conclusions 
Transaction costs matter for effective organisation and institutional management of scarce and 
costly resources, such as water. During times of drought, formal institutions may provide costly and 
inflexible management arrangements that may increase the total transaction cost requirements. This 
paper explores the transaction costs that are associated with a historical transition toward informal 
drought management arrangements in the PRB of northern Italy. We test two hypotheses related to 
the value of transaction cost analysis in support of institutional transition/substitution choices, and 
the value of historical context to economic investigations. By measuring and tracking transaction 
costs with respect to drought periods in the basin we explore the total costs associated with a new 
institutional approach, and note that the DSC arrangements have been mandatorily adopted by the 
six other River Basin Districts in Italy—somewhat ironically, as this has formalised what was 
originally an informal process. It remains to be seen whether the formalisation of drought 
management arrangements based on the PRB DSC will ultimately increase total transaction costs, or 
further reduce the total transaction costs of drought management in Italy by following a 
participatory, consensus-based approach elsewhere. However, it is impossible to draw more robust 
conclusions without a more detailed study of centralised costs. That said, in contrast to standard 
approaches where a complete set of empirics might be provided, some may find our approach here 
less satisfying. However, we would argue that value is provided by the thought and measurement 
processes that have gone into the study, rather than arriving at any ‘number’. The process of 
empirically identifying, measuring, and assessing transaction costs is in its infancy; but remains a 
critical means by which adaptive effectiveness and efficiency for future institutional choices will 
potentially be explored, as we have done in this case. While our empirics may not be complete they 
do provide a valid contribution where—as we have pointed out—it is our intention to explore 
additional means by which we can get at a final set of ‘numbers’ in support of the full costs and 
benefits. Like all good research, it is a process, and one that we are interested to continue following. 
Overall, though, our study highlights the usefulness of transaction cost case studies, and the need for 
extensions to this approach that incorporate not only transaction and abatement cost minimisation 
evaluations, but also assessments of per unit private/public welfare benefits that accrue from policy 
and programs, such that more comprehensive evaluations and uncertainty analyses may be achieved 
in the future. We believe this to be a rich area of future research that may require the incorporation 
of climate, hydrological, and economic modelling assessments to be successful. 
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, S.S., A.L., and C.D.P.-B.; methodology, A.L., S.S.; validation, S.S.; 
formal analysis, S.S., A.L., C.D.P.-B.; investigation, S.S.; resources, S.S., J.M.; data curation, S.S.; writing—original 
draft preparation, A.L., S.S., C.D.P.-B.; writing—review and editing, A.L., C.D.P.-B., S.S.; visualization, J.M.; 
supervision, A.L., C.D.P.-B., J.M.; project administration, J.M.; funding acquisition, J.M., A.L., C.D.P.-B. All 
authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. 
Funding: Adam Loch’s involvement in this research was funded under an Australian Research Council DECRA 
grant (DE150100328) and the 2015-16 UNESCO Grants Program. Carlos Dionisio Pérez-Blanco’s involvement in 
this research was supported by the Program for the Attraction of Scientific Talent's SWAN (Sustainable 
Watersheds: Emerging Economic Instruments for Water and Food Security) Project, and by the Ministerio para 
la Transición Ecológica y el Reto Demográfico, through Fundación Biodiversidad (ATACC Project—Adaptación 
Transformativa al Cambio Climático en el Regadío).  
Acknowledgments: The authors are thankful to Graham Marshall and David Adamson for useful comments 
and advice on earlier drafts of the paper, and to the experts from the Po River Basin Authority and the 
Environment Agency of Emilia-Romagna for their valuable support in this research. The authors thank Mattia 
Amadio for drawing Figure 1c. 
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
  
Water 2020, 12, 1866 17 of 19 
 
Appendix A 
Figure A1. Measures of DSC individual ex ante/ex post transaction cost categories over time. 
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